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3  From Martinez de Hoz 
to Alfonsin 
In this chapter, we review the central phase of Argentine debt accumulation. 
Between  1976 and  1981, the gross external debt increased by  $27 billion. 
The  debthncome ratio  increased  from  less  than  20 percent  to  nearly  50 
percent.  Near the end of the  1970s, the  growth of  debt was primarily  the 
counterpart of capital flight.  In the  1980s it resulted from the mechanics of 
debt accumulation-interest  on debt rolled over (at high real  interest rates) 
into an ever-growing indebtedness. 
Table  3.1  lists  the  presidents  and  economics  ministers  of  the  various 
administrations in this period. Politically,  these years can be divided into the 
Martinez  de  Hoz  phase  (1976-81),  the  transition  from  military  to 
democratic regime, and the Alfonsin regime. In the Martinez de Hoz period, 
it  is common  to distinguish  the  years  through  January  1979 from the  rest 
which are characterized by the administration of an exchange rate tablita. In 
the transition  period,  the  main  events  are the  Malvinas  War and the great 
debt  liquidation  under  Economics  Minister  J.  M.  Dagnino  Pastore  and 
Central  Bank  President  Domingo  Cavallo  in  August  1982. Finally,  in  the 
Alfonsin administration, three phases are apparent: an initial mismanagement 
under Economics Minister  Grinspun, the  Austral  Plan,  and the  subsequent 
drift toward  renewed  inflation  and loss of  control. In this  chapter  we will 
discuss  the  period  through  the  Austral  Plan,  and  will  highlight  thc  chicf 
macroeconomic  events and their reflection  in the  external  buildup of  debt. 
We focus on the Martinez de Hoz period because it is central to the buildup 
of external debt via capital flight. 
3.1  Martinez de Hoz 
When the military coup overthrew the Peronist regime in March  1976, the 
country was on the verge of hyperinflation. Consumer price inflation declined 
Table 3.1  Presidents and Economics Ministers,  1976-88 
President  Period  Economics Minister  Period 
Videla*  311976-311981  Martinez de Hoz  311976-31198 I 
Viola*  31198 1 -  I21198 I  Sigaut  311981 -  1211981 
Galtien*  121198  1 -611982  Alemann  121198 1-61 I982 
Bignone*  711982-  1211983  Dagnino Pastore  71 1982- 81 1982 
Wehbe  811982- 1211983 
Sourrouille  211985-611989 
Alfonsin  121 1983-  Grinspun  1211983-211985 
Note:  An  asterisk (*) denotes a military government 65  ArgentindChapter 3 
from nearly 40 percent per month in March  1976 to less than 3 percent  by 
June, but by the end of  the year inflation had risen to 150-200  percent per 
year (table 3.2). Inflation fighting would thus become a constant preoccupa- 
tion of the Martinez de Hoz administration. 
Among the policies of the Martinez de Hoz administration, two measures 
stand  out. One is the  financial  market  reform,  initiated  in June  1977; the 
other is the exchange rate tablita, which was introduced in January 1979 and 
lasted until early  1981. 
3.1.1  Financial Reform 
In the Peronist  period  interest rates had been regulated  and, by  the end, 
were  significantly  negative.  Financial  repression  had  been  an  important 
means  of  financing  large budget  deficits.  Under  the  new  rules,  the budget 
deficit  was  to  be  financed  in  the  capital  market  rather  than  by  money 
creation.  Banks were free to offer interest rates and deposits and to charge 
for services. 
In order to make the transition  from the repressed  system to the new, free 
market  approach,  extensive  banking  regulation  was  required.  Specifically, 
reserve requirements  had  to be  set high enough to ensure that the banking 
system would be required to hold the stock of government debt already in its 
portfolio.  This  was  accomplished  by  setting  high  reserve  requirements, 
initially  at  45  percent.  But  these  requirements  implied  a  large  spread 
between  active and passive  rates.  To  circumvent  this problem,  the Central 
Bank  introduced  a  system  called  the  Cuenta  de  Regulacidn  Monefaria, 
which compensated  banks for reserves.  There was also a charge levied on 
that  part  of  demand  deposits  not  covered  by  reserve  requirements.’  A 
number of  factors combined  to make the  cuenfu run  deficits:  high  market 
interest rates and hence a high ratio of M2 to M1, and a charge on demand 
deposits based on an estimate of expected inflation.  As a result, the deficit of 
the  cuentu averaged  1 percent  of  GDP during  1977-81  and  reached  2.8 
percent of GDP in 1978. 
The effect of  financial  liberalization on real, active interest rates  can be 
seen  in  figure  3.1.  Until  1977  real  interest  rates  were  overwhelmingly 
negative.  Following  the  financial  reform,  real  rates  became  more  nearly 
positive, particularly  in  1980. 
Calvo (1987) has argued that the financial reform was an important reason 
for the real exchange rate appreciation seen earlier in figure 1.3. Restraint of 
Table 3.2  Economic Change in the Martinez de Hoz Period (percent per year) 
1976:I  197631  1977  1978  1979  1980 
Inflation  706  I82  176  I76  160  101 
Growth  -1.1  2.0  6.3  -3.4  6.6  1.1 
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Fig. 3.1  Active real interest rates (percent per month) 
domestic credit creation, combined with a deficit in the budget,  which was 
no  longer financed  by  the Central Bank, implied  that  both  the private  and 
public  sector were borrowing  abroad. Calvo interpreted  this  as  the country 
borrowing  abroad to put  foreign exchange in the Central Bank, which then 
by monetization of the reserve inflow would provide domestic money. Thus 
the policy amounted to a strict application  of the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments. 
Table 3.3 shows the balance of payments statistics. The Calvo interpreta- 
tion  certainly  correctly  represents  the  period  up  to  1979-80.  Following 
financial reform, and given high average real interest rates, firms preferred to 
borrow abroad rather than in the home market. In this period, the increase in 
the  gross  external  debt has a  counterpart in  capital imports by  firms  and 
reserve gains by the Central Bank. This pattern is particularly  clear in 1979. 
Table 3.3  The Balance of Payments and Gross External Debt (in billions of $US) 
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-0.5  -4.1  -4.7  -  2.4 
0.6  -2.6  -0.9  2.6 
4.1  2.6  I .5  -2.3 
4.2  2.0  -1.1  -3.1 
-0.0  -0.4  0.0  1.1 
0.5  0.9  2.5  -0.4 
4.4  -2.5  -3.4  -5.1 
19.0  27.2  35.7  43.6 
Source: Indicudores de Coyunruru, various issues 67  ArgentindChapter 3 
Financial reform  was  not  the  only reason for capital inflows-the  tablita 
certainly was part of the attraction. 
3.1.2  The Tablita 
The  disappointing progress  toward  disinflation  led  the  government  to 
announce a disinflation strategy based  on reduced,  preannounced rates of 
disinflation  in  December  1978. The theory  behind  this  disinflation policy 
relied  on  the Chicago School  “law  of  one  price,”  popularized by  Harry 
Johnson and Robert Mundell. This view held that prices in any country were 
strongly  linked  to  the  world  price  level.  Given  this  link,  a  policy  of 
depreciation inevitably meant inflation, thereby  requiring further deprecia- 
tion which, in turn, would lead to continuing inflation. 
In  order  to  break  this  vicious  cycle  of  inflation  and  depreciation, 
policymakers opted to set a path of  reduced exchange depreciation, hoping 
that it would feed through into reduced inflation. At  the same time, targets 
were set for public sector wages and prices as well as for the expansion of 
domestic  credit.  The  Plan  of  December  20th  had  these  specific 
announcements  : 
Public sector wages and prices were to rise at a monthly rate of 4 percent 
over the following eight months. 
Domestic  credit  was  to  grow  at  4  percent  per  month  during  the  first 
semester of  1979. 
The exchange depreciation was to be 5.4 percent for January  1979, and 
would  decline  from  that  level  by  0.2  percent  per  month  until  August 
1981. 
Three  linkages  from  depreciation  to  inflation  were  anticipated.  First, 
expectations of  depreciation were built automatically into pricing. Reducing 
the rate of  depreciation would lead firms to reduce their inflation forecasts 
and hence their price increases. Second, the rate of increase of import prices 
would be dampened by reduced depreciation. Third, firms competing with 
importables would be forced into price discipline. As can be seen, therefore, 
reduced depreciation was  thought to bring down inflation through  various 
channels. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the expectations channel. To  reinforce 
this effect, the future path of  the exchange rate was preannounced. Thus in 
December 1978, the authorities announced that depreciation rates would fall 
from 5.2 to 4 percent per month over the next eight months. This procedure 
was followed until early 1981 when the system broke down as a result of the 
progressive overvaluation shown in figure 3.2. 
The law  of  one price was also expected to apply to interest rates. Hence 
pre-fixing the rate  of  depreciation was thought to rapidly reduce domestic 
interest rates to the level of  those prevailing abroad, adjusted of  course for 
the rate of depreciation. With an interest rate (including spread) in New York 68  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de hblo 
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Fig. 3.2  The real exchange rate (index 1980-82  = 100) 
of 0.15 percent per month, for example, and a depreciation rate of 4 percent 
per month, the Argentine interest rate should be 5.6 percent. 
Table  3.4  shows  the  quarterly  monthly  rates  of  depreciation,  the  CPI 
inflation rate, the nominal interest rate, and the real exchange rate. There are 
two margins to consider. One is between  the nominal interest rate and  the 
rate of depreciation. This margin, if announcements are believed, directs the 
choice  between  borrowing  in  Argentina  or  abroad.  When  the  Argentine 
interest  rate  exceeds  the  announced  rate  of  depreciation,  there  should  be 
borrowing  in  the  world  market.  The relation  between  the  nominal  interest 
rate and the rate of  inflation tells us about the profitability  of  borrowing or 
the accumulation of real debts. 
Nineteen seventy-nine is a typical  year for the combination of policies to 
attract  capital  inflows.  Interest  rates  are very  high  relative  to  the  rate  of 
depreciation. The return from borrowing in New York and lending in Buenos 
Aires  in  December  1979,  for  example,  is  above  50  percent  per  year! 
Moreover, because of high (and growing) reserves, the policy  is believable. 
The moderate current account deficit supports the idea that the exchange rate 
policy  is  sustainable.  As  a  result,  capital  inflows  are  exceptionally  high 
throughout the year. The increase in external debt exceeds the capital flows, 
but not by a wide margin. In 1980 real interest rates turned sharply positive, 
which  suggests  that  financial  market  integration  is  as imperfect  as goods 
market  integration since the  government  could  implement  a tight  domestic 
money strategy even under a pre-fixed exchange rate regime. 
3.1.3  The Collapse 
The large discrepancy  between  depreciation  and  inflation  meant  gradual 
appreciation of  the real exchange rate.  Between March  1976 and December 69  Argentidchapter 3 
Table 3.4  The Tublita Period (quarterly percentage rates, except as noted) 
Interest  Real Exchange Rate 
Depreciation  Inflation  Passive  Active  Morgan Guaranty  PD/PM 
1978 
I  21.4  28.1  21.7  37.8  82  71 
11  11.5  26.3  22.3  26.9  87  80 
Ill  8.3  19.4  20.7  25.0  93  89 
IV  15.5  27.8  21.5  24.6  100  LOO 
1979 
I  15.5  31.5  20.7  23.3  110  I09 
I1  14.2  27.0  20.9  23.0  I20  I09 
I11  12.2  27.3  23.2  25.7  I30  I17 
IV  10.2  11.0  20.6  23.5  133  I15 
1980 
I  8.3  14.2  16.6  19.4  134  I10 
I1  6.5  15.5  15.0  18.1  137  I14 
111  4.5  9.7  16.2  19.9  141  I16 
IV  3. I  14.2  15.1  18.8  156  114 
1981 
1  17.6  14.0  21.7  26.7  157  I07 
Sources:  Fernandez (1985) and Morgan Guaranty. 
Nure: The inflation rate refers to nonagricultural  wholesale prices. The real exchange rate is an index with 
base  1978: IV =  100. The measure of  Morgan Guaranty compares nonfood wholesale prices in Argentina to 
the  trade  weighted  average  abroad.  The second  measure  of  the  real  exchange rate refers  to the relative 
wholesale price of  domestic goods  and imports, P,/P,+,. 
1978, the real exchange rate (as shown in  fig. 3.2) had already appreciated 
by 20 percent. During the first year of the tublitu, real appreciation amounted 
to 33 percent and was an additional 17 percent in  1980. Only in  1980 did it 
become widely apparent that the disinflation strategy might fail. Inflation had 
declined, but not by  an amount sufficient to justify  a belief that exchange 
rate-based  disinflation could be pursued long enough to bring inflation down 
to tolerable levels. 
The  increasingly  apparent  overvaluation  was  not  the  only  reason  for 
unrest.  The failure of  major banks,  resulting from dishonesty in manage- 
ment, created financial uncertainty and forced the government to take over 
these institutions. Due to very  high real  interest rates that persisted for an 
extended period,  the government had  started  accumulating internal debts. 
This  combination  of  factors  brought  about  a  wave  of  capital  outflows. 
Beginning in  the  second quarter  of  1980,  the  Central  Bank  experienced 
reserve  losses.  For  the  year,  these  losses  came  to  nearly  $3  billion,  as 
shown  in  figure  3.3.  In  the  first  quarter  of  1981 reserve losses were  $3 
billion. 
The current account deteriorated in a major way  beginning in  1980. The 
main reason for the worsening was a large increase in imports. The huge real 
appreciation,  along  with  some  trade  liberalization,  led  to  an  increase  in 













Fig. 3.3  International reserves (in millions of $U.S.) 
still more than compensated.  As  1981 began, the  growth  in world  interest 
rates started to have a strong effect on the current account. 
These actual and prospective reserve losses reinforced the belief  that the 
exchange  rate  policy  could  not  be  sustained,  and  thus  led  to even more 
capital  flight.  Another factor was  important, namely,  the  change from one 
president to  another.  In October 1980 the presidency of Roberto Viola was 
announced,  and,  from  that  time  on, Martinez  de Hoz  was  a  lame  duck 
economics  minister.  The new  president  was  unwilling  to commit  himself, 
ahead of  time, to Martinez  de Hoz-style  policy.  As a result,  there  was an 
overt ambiguity about continuity in the domestic economy. The public drew 
the  obvious  lesson  and  shifted their  monies  into foreign assets. The large 
capital flight, only incompletely offset by public sector borrowing  in world 
markets,  implied  unsustainable  reserve  losses.  By  late  1980 the  exchange 
rate announcements ceased to be believed, and in February  1981 Martinez de 
Hoz  was  forced to violate the precommitted  exchange  rate targets by  a  10 
percent devaluation on top of  the 2 percent preannounced depreciation. 
It is interesting to ask why the program failed. For some, the answer is as 
obvious as why a car on square wheels cannot move.  But at a deeper level, 
the program was supported by at least a tendency toward the law of one price 
and  a  tendency  for  interest  arbitrage  to  occur.  A  model  suggested  by 
Rodriguez  and  Sjaastad  (1979)  and  Dornbusch  (1982)  gives  the  essential 
elements.  We  focus the discussion here using  a diagram, while in appendix 
A we develop  the necessary  equations.  Two variables  are at  the center  of 
attention, the real exchange rate (R = P,/e) and the rate of price inflation of 
nontraded  goods (IT).  The vertical  schedule in figure 3.4 shows a pre-fixed 
(constant) rate of depreciation (Ao). The rate of traded goods price inflation is 71  Argentidchapter 3 
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Fig. 3.4  The adjustment process under a tublita 
assumed to be equal to the  rate of depreciation.  The real  exchange  rate is 
appreciating to the right of the vertical schedule and depreciating to the left. 
We assume that the rate of home goods price inflation increases whenever 
the real exchange rate depreciates.  We  also assume that the level of the real 
exchange rate and of the real interest rate affects home goods price inflation. 
A high relative price of home goods slows down inflation because of  excess 
supply, as does a high real interest rate. 
In figure 3.4 we see the process of adjustment to a reduction  in the rate 
of  depreciation.  We  start  at  point  A  and  the  rate  of  depreciation  is 
permanently  reduced  from  A,  to  A,.  The  immediate  effect  of  reduced 
depreciation  is to slow the  rate of  inflation  of  traded  goods. Home  goods 
price  inflation  is  affected  through  two  separate  channels:  on one  hand, 
there  is  a  reduced  rate  of  inflation  via  expectations  effects,  and  on  the 
other,  the  decline  in  the  nominal  interest  rate  resulting  from international 
interest  arbitrage  would  increase  demand.  We  assume  the  former  effect 
dominates  so  that  inflation  immediately  starts slowing  down.3 But,  as  is 
apparent from the figure, the slowing of inflation is only gradual,  while the 
reduction  in depreciation has moved  ahead. Hence the real exchange rate is 
appreciating.  Over  time,  inflation  and  the  real  exchange rate  follow  the 
path indicated by the arrows. Inflation does fall, but the real exchange rate 
keeps appreciating. 
The model  suggests that given enough time  the economy  will  converge 
to  a  point  where  the  real  exchange  rate  has  declined  to  the  initial  level. 
Note,  however,  that  at the  very  moment  when  inflation  is  first reduced  to 
the  target rate,  at point D,  victory  on the inflation  front comes at a price. 
Now  the  real  exchange  rate  is  highly  overvalued,  and  the  disinflation 
process  must continue.  Inflation  has  to  fall below  the  rate  of  depreciation 
(via recession  in  the  economy)  until  competitiveness  is  restored.  Only  at 72  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
that point (at B)  will  inflation  settle down to the lower rate of  depreciation 
and real  interest rates return to the initial level. The problem  is that on the 
way,  at  a  point  such  as D,  the  large  real  appreciation  poses  credibility 
problems.  Reserve losses  can  emerge because  of  fear that  the  authorities 
will  not  sit out the full  adjustment. This is, in fact, what  occurred  in late 
1980 and early 198  1. 
The difficulty  with  what Fernandez  (1985) has called  the  “expectations 
management  approach”  is primarily  that  the  adjustment  is  not  rapid  and 
hence  may  not  survive changes of  regime.  There  is  also, of  course,  the 
difficulty  of  accumulating  current  account  deficits,  which  affects  the 
long-run sustainable real exchange rate. 
The data in  table 3.4 confirm the pattern of real appreciation, but do not 
support the  decline  in  real  interest  rates  predicted  by  this  model.  Thus, 
incomplete integration of  the capital market is as much of a difficulty as the 
poor integration of  goods markets. Of course, if capital markets were more 
integrated,  the  sharp  reduction  in  the  real  interest  rate  could  make 
disinflation more difficult. 
The slow disinflation  is explained  here  in terms of  inflation inertia, but 
we  must  also mention  separately  the  issue  of  the budget.  Budget  deficits 
continued  to be large, and hence on the fiscal  side there  was certainly no 
support to  disinflation.  Moreover,  a  point  Carlos Diaz  Alejandro  (1964) 
makes comes into play.  He argues that  in  a situation  of  real  depreciation, 
the  income  effects  and  income  redistribution  appear  rapidly,  and  the 
substitution  effects work  only  gradually.  He concludes that,  as a  result, a 
real  depreciation  tends  to  have  recessionary  effects.  The  converse,  of 
course, applies in the situation of  real appreciation which we are discussing 
here.  The rise  in the standard  of  living  that  comes from real  depreciation 
sustains  prosperity  (la plutu duke) for  a  while  before  substitution  effects 
take over and create unemployment  and trade problems. 
3.2  Estimates of Capital Flight 
The extent of private capital outflows in this episode cannot be measured 
unambiguously.  The  balance  of  payments  statistics  and  the  debt  are 
imperfect.  Moreover,  the  current  account statistics  may  misrepresent  true 
trade transactions  because  of  misinvoicing  (for purposes  of  tax  evasion  or 
capital flight), and they certainly understate  military imports. 
A  possible  method  to calculate  the  increase in  Argentine  private  assets 
abroad  would  use the debt and balance  of  payments  statistics  as fol10ws.~ 
The increase in assets has to be financed. The sources for this financing are 
the increase  in debt  plus the change in reserves  minus  the current account 
deficit and foreign direct investment in Argentina. Using equation (l), which 
shows the counterpart of  the increase  in debt, we calculate the increase  in 
private assets abroad (other private capital outflows) as a residual item: 73  ArgentinaChapter 3 
(1)  Increase in debt  = Current account deficit 
- Direct and long-term capital inflows 
+ Official reserve increases 
+ Other private capital outflows. 
Table 3.5 gives  the  calculation  for the  period  1978-82  and  shows that 
interest  payments  were financed  almost entirely by the noninterest  surplus. 
Thus virtually the entire increase in external debt has as a counterpart private 
accumulation of  assets abroad, i.e., capital flight. 
Various  estimates  of  capital  flight  from  Argentina  are  reported  in 
Rodriguez (1987) and Cumby and Levich (1987). These estimates, although 
the  authors  use  different  methodologies,  broadly  support  the  same 
conclusion: Argentina external debt has as a counterpart  substantial private 
assets  accumulated  abroad.  Moreover,  when  these  asset  estimates  are 
combined with  accumulated  interest,  they  come close  in  magnitude  to the 
entire external debt. 
Figure 2.4 above already showed the debVincome ratio of Argentina since 
1970. The striking fact of the period under discussion is the dramatic rise in 
debt due not to conditions in the world economy  which raised  debt service 
or  deteriorated  commodity  prices-that  came  later-but  rather  to capital 
flight  arising  from  domestic  macroeconomic  and  political  experiments 
which  backfired.  It  would  be  wrong  to  argue  that  Martinez  de  Hoz’s 
experiments  are  exclusively  responsible  for  Argentina’s  debt  problems 
today, but his policies certainly  reinforced the precarious  financial position 
inherited  from  the  Peronist  period.  They  also  left  a  severe  mortgage  for 
subsequent administrations.  In retrospect,  the  Martinez de Hoz program  is 
so  striking  because  it  reveals  an  arrogance  of  power  of  which  only 
totalitarian regimes are capable. 
3.3  The Transition 
The period  between  the  collapse  of  the  Martinez  de  Hoz  program  in 
March  1981 and  the  advent  of  democratic  government  in  December  1983 
is  primarily  one  of  disarray.  Rising  inflation  and  intensifying  debt 
problems,  the  Malvinas  War,  and the  internal  debt crisis  characterize  this 
period. 
Table 3.5  Estimate of Capital Flight, 1978-82  (in billions of $U.S.) 
Current Account 
Increase in Debt  Interest  Noninterest  Increase in External Assets 
26.8  -9.3  6.8  23.4 
Source:  Dornbusch (1985a). 74  Rudiger Dornbusch and Juan Carlos de Pablo 
The years from 1981 to 1985 can be best understood  by  considering  the 
constraints  faced  by  policymakers.  First, there  was  an overriding  external 
constraint.  The inability  to  rollover  debt automatically  to  finance  current 
account deficits in the world market, following the  1982 Malvinas War and 
the  Mexican  crisis,  meant  that  there  was  a  permanent  foreign  exchange 
crisis. The foreign  exchange crisis  required  high  interest  rates  to prevent 
capital  flight  and  to  keep down the black  market  rate.  It  also required  a 
competitive  real  exchange rate, but  such a rate necessitated  a reduction  in 
real wages unless public sector prices were reduced to maintain the standard 
of  living.  This  tradeoff  between  real  wages  and  competitiveness  was  a 
growing  source  of  inflation  and  budget  difficulties  in  the  coming  years. 
Finally, growth could not be neglected.  Policy  at this time bounced around 
between  objectives of  growth and low inflation and the limits provided  by 
the external constraint. 
The existing  private  debt  played  an  important  part  in  the  attempt  to 
manage the external constraint. The authorities encountered great difficulties 
in making private debtors maintain their external indebtedness in the face of 
real  depreciation.  Firms  with  dollar-denominated  debts  were  facing  the 
prospect  of  large  depreciation  and  were  consequently  tempted  to  borrow 
domestically  to  pay  off  the external  debt.  To  avoid  the  resulting  reserve 
drain, two measures were taken: interest rates were raised dramatically,  and 
exchange rate guarantees were offered. 
The high  real  interest  rates  led  to bankruptcy  problems,  which  we  will 
discuss shortly.  The exchange rate  guarantees  proved  exceedingly  costly 
later  when  they  had  to be  met  following  a  significant  depreciation. They 
resulted  in  huge  financing requirements  as  the  government bought  foreign 
exchange at a high dollar rate to give away cheap to those  firms who had 
accepted the guarantee. Since the dollar purchases  were financed by money 
creation, they provided the fuel for rising inflation. 
Another development of  this period  is the growing nationalization  of the 
external  debt.  An  alternative  to  exchange  rate  guarantees  was  for  the 
government  to assume directly  external debts, for example, by taking over 
failing financial institutions.  From the end of  1980 to the end of  1983, the 
external debt increased by $26 billion. The share of the public sector in that 
debt rose from 52 to 71.8 percent. The large increase in external debt meant 
increasing burdens on the budget. 
The policy  of  high  real  interest  rates  that  was  used  in  1979-82,  first 
as part  of  the  disinflation  program  and  then  increasingly  to  stop capital 
outflows,  led  to a  sharp rise  in  private  debt. Figure 3.5 shows the  hypo- 
thetical  accumulation  of  real  debt  for  someone  who  borrowed  1  peso 
in  July  1977  at  the  outset  of  financial  liberalization  and  rolled  over  the 
debt  continuously  at  the  unregulated  active  rate.  Note,  in  particular,  the 
extreme  increase  in  indebtedness  between  late  1979  and  mid-1981-a 
60 percent rise in the real value of  the debt. Such an increase in only two 75  ArgentindChapter 3 
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Fig. 3.5  The real value of debts (1977:6 = 1) 
years  outpaces  any  possible  real  return  on  investment.  As  a  result, 
firms  who  had  borrowed  from  banks  were  progressively  moving  toward 
bankruptcy. 
To  cope  with  the  internal  debt  problem,  Economics  Minister  Dagnino 
Pastore  and  Domingo  Cavallo,  president  of  the  Central  Bank,  liquidated 
debts in July and August  1982. The means used for debt liquidation was the 
fixing of nominal interest rates far below the rate of  inflation. But, as is clear 
from  figure  3.5,  the  measure  provided  only  temporary  relief.  Debt 
accumulation began once again  after the  new economics team  decided that 
their priority was to use tight money to fight rising  inflation and continuing 
balance of payments deficits. Significant steps to address the problems using 
fiscal policy never occurred.  In fact, the inflation tax was used increasingly 
to pay exchange rate guarantees, external debt service, and rising real wages 
in the public sector. We  consider that process in more detail in the following 
chapter. 
3.4  Alfonsin 
When  the  Alfonsin  administration  took  office  in  December  1983, the 
economy  was  already  in  terrible  shape. Inflation  had  risen  from only  100 
percent  in  1980 to  more than  400 percent.  Real wages had  been  increased 
sharply  in the  final phase  of  the  military government, and  the  real  money 
stock-the  base  for the  inflation  tax-had  been  progressively  eroded.  M1 
had declined to only 4.1 percent  of  GDP, down from 7.9 percent  in  1980. 
The ratio of M4 to GDP had fallen from 27.8 percent in  1980 to only  12.4 
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External  debt  had  risen  steadily  over the  period  since  1980. Table  3.6 
shows the rising debt as well as the sharp increase in the interest bill.  Since 
1982 half  of  the  interest  had  been  paid  using  noninterest  surpluses.  The 
difficulty of  achieving these surpluses was aggravated  by  sharply declining 
terms  of  trade  beginning  in  1981.  In  terms  of  resource  transfers,  the 
country  had  brought  about  a  massive  shift  in  the  noninterest  current 
account. Resource transfers that had been inward at the rate of  more than  1 
percent  now moved outward.  The shift abroad of resource transfers of 4-6 
percent  of  GDP showed  up  throughout  the  macroeconomy  in  the  form  of 
high  real  interest  rates  and  inflation,  which  were  the  means  to crowd  out 
enough private  spending to free resources for debt service. 
Initial policies of  the Alfonsin administration failed to effect fundamental 
changes.  Real  wages  were  increased,  even  as  an  IMF  program  was 
attempted. On the external debt side, the new economics minister, Grinspun, 
initiated  a  strong  rhetoric  that  was  endorsed  by  Alfonsin.  But  rhetoric 
notwithstanding, resource transfers remained enormous, inflation soared, and 
any semblance of  control disintegrated when in early 1985 the country went 
to the brink of  hyperinflation. 
When  the  Alfonsin  administration  came  into  office,  expectations  and 
hopes  were  limitless.  By  early  1985 output  was  declining  and  inflation, 
which  on  a  December-to-December  basis  had  been  nearly  700  percent 
in  1984,  accelerated  sharply  toward  3,000  percent.  The  budget  deficit 
financed  internally  had  risen  from 6-7  percent  in  1981-82  to  12 percent 
in  1983-84.  In the second quarter of  1985 it rose to 23.7 per~ent.~ 
The  government  saw  no  option  except  to  attack  the  inflation  problem 
head on. But how? Creating a deep recession was politically  excluded and 
economically  unpromising.  Relying  on controls  by  themselves  would  not 
do  much,  as  many  previous  attempts  in  Argentina  had  demonstrated. 
Hence  the  search  began  for  a program  combining  orthodoxy  with  respect 
to  monetary  and  fiscal  adjustments  with  heterodoxy  in  avoiding  the 
recessionary  effect  of  macroeconomic  restraint.  In  chapter  5 we  study  the 
Austral  Plan,  which  was  supposed  to  be  the  answer  to  the  stabilization 
dilemma;  but  before  doing  so, we  take  a  closer  look  in  chapter  4  at  the 
economics of hyperinflation. 
Table 3.6  External Debt and Resource Transfers (in billions of $U.S., except as noted) 
1980  I981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
External debt  21.2  35.7  43.6  44.8  47.8  48.3 
Interest due  I .o  3.0  4.4  5.0  5.3  4.9 
Current account  -4.8  -4.7  -2.4  -2.5  -2.4  -1.0 
Resource transfer (% of GDP)  -  3.3  -  1.2  3.0  3.9  4.5  6.0 
Source:  World  Bank 